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An Analysis of Policy Alternatives to
the Dairy Price Support Program
Harry M. Kaiser
This paper investigates the impacts of alternative federal dairy policies on the U.S. dairy
sector. In addition to the current dairy price support program, five alternatives are
investigated: (1) immediate deregulation, (2) gradual deregulation, (3) target price-deficiency
payment program without supply control, (4) target price-deficiency payment program with
supply control, and (5) mandatory supply control. An econometric model of the national dairy
industry is used to simulate quarterly equilibrium price and quantity values at the farm and
wholesale levels for each policy over the period 1980-90. Consumers are better off under
both immediate and gradual deregulation, as well as the target price-deficiency payment
scenarios because prices are lower, enabling them to consume more dairy products. Farmers,
as a group, are better off under the two target price-deficiency payment program and supply
control scenarios, where milk prices and producer surplus are highest.
The U.S. dairy industry has operated under the
current dairy price support program (DPSP) since
1949. The program is intended to stabilize dairy
farmer income and lessen the seasonal instability
in milk prices. The DPSP indirectly supports the
farm milk price by standing ready to purchase un-
limited quantities of storable manufactured dairy
products at specified purchase prices through the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The gov-
ernment thus attempts to maintain the market price
for raw milk at or near the support price by in-
creasing the farm demand for raw milk when nec-
essary. The DPSP acts much like a buffer stock
mechanism with purchases during the spring
“flush production” period and releases in the
“slack production” periods typically in the fall
and winter.
In the early- and mid- 1980s, chronic excess pro-
duction relative to commercial needs led to CCC
purchases under the DPSP that were excessively
large (over 10% of production being removed dur-
ing the peak years). The surpluses were due in
large part to several increases in the milk support
price in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The gov-
ernment attempted to deal with the problem by
introducing two voluntary supply control pro-
grams—the 1984-85 Milk Diversion Program
(MDP) and the 1986-87 Dairy Termination Pro-
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gram (DTP)—and by linking the support price to
estimated CCC purchases. Since 1981, the support
price declined from $13.39 per hundredweight to
its current level of $10.10,
Recently, several farm organizations have criti-
cized the DPSP on the grounds that the support
level is too low. In June 1993, several members of
Congress and Secretary Espy met with dairy farm-
ers in Pennsylvania to discuss alternatives to the
DPSP. Agricultural support programs have be-
come targeted for elimination by some in order to
reduce the federal deficit, as evidenced by the re-
cent termination of the honey, wool, and mohair
price support programs. Consequently, policy
makers may take a serious look at alternatives to
the DPSP in the debate over the next farm bill.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the
market impacts of alternative federal dairy poli-
cies. In addition to the current DPSP, five altern-
ativesare investigated: (1) immediate deregulation,
where the DPSP is simply eliminated, (2) gradual
deregulation, where the purchase prices for dairy
products are decreased by 10% per year for the
entire simulation period, (3) a target price-
deficiency payment program without supply con-
trol, (4) a target price-deficiency payment program
with supply control to contain government costs,
and (5) a mandatory supply control program. Since
there have been two recent studies examining vol-
untary supply control policies for dairy (Dixon,
Susanto, and Berry; Bausell, Belsley, and Smith),
this type of policy is not examined here, however,
the MDP and DTP are part of the baseline sce-
nario.Alternative Dairy Policies 159
Conceptual Model
The model considers the dairy industry’s whole-
sale and farm sectors, The retail sector is excluded
because available national consumption data are
commercial disappearance at the wholesale rather
than retail level. Four types of wholesalers are rep-
resented in the model: fluid milk, frozen dairy
products, cheese, and butter processors. 1
Two major federal programs currently regulate
dairy prices: federal milk marketing orders and the
DPSP. The federal order program is included in all
policy scenarios with the simplifying assumption
of a single federal milk marketing order, The in-
clusion of the federal order program for all policy
scenarios is reasonable since federal orders are not
a critical part of the policy debate related to the
DPSP. There is discussion of modifying or elimi-
nating the federal order program, but this is a sep-
arate policy issue. The single national federal order
is captured in the model by constraining prices
processors pay for raw milk to be minimum class
prices, That is, fluid milk processors are required
to pay the higher Class I price, while cheese pro-
cessors pay the lower Class 111price. Federal milk
marketing orders all currently utilize three product
classes with Class I being fluid products, Class II
being soft manufactured dairy products, and Class
III being hard manufactured dairy products. A
two-class system is assumed in this study, with all
fluid products in Class I and all manufactured
products in Class II. Hence, the term “Class II
price” in this paper refers to the price paid for milk
used in manufactured dairy products and is the
same as the Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) price.
Since the Class II and Class III prices typically
only differ by a marginal amount, this is not a
limiting assumption.
The DPSP is included in the baseline and the
gradual deregulation policy scenario, but is elimi-
nated in the immediate deregulation, target price-
deficiency payment, and supply control scenarios.
The DPSP is incorporated into the model by con-
straining the wholesale market cheese and butter
prices to be equal to the government purchase
prices. Since the government is willing to purchase
unlimited quantities of these products at an-
nounced purchase prices, the program indirectly
supports the farm milk price by increasing farm-
level milk demand.
The wholesale market for each of the four dairy
‘ Fluid milk, frozen products, cheese, and butter are expressed on a
milkfat equivalent basis in the mwlel. Since all quantities are expressed
on a milkfat basis, nonfat dry milk is not included in the model,
products is defined by a set of supply and demand
functions and an equilibrium condition. The
wholesale fluid milk and frozen product markets
have the following general specification:
(1.1) Q‘d’ = fp’’{s’+’d’),
(1.2) Q“i = jiyqw’),
(1.3) Qwsi= Qwdi,
where: Qwdiand Qwsiare wholesale demand and
supply, respectively, for product i (i = fluid milk
or frozen products), Pw’is the wholesale price of
product i, Swdiis a vector of wholesale demand
shifters for product i including income, generic
advertising expenditures, and prices of substitutes,
and S’”S1 is a vector of wholesale supply shifters for
product i including the price of farm milk (Class I
price for fluid milk and Class II price for frozen
products), other input costs, and lagged supply,
The DPSP directly affects the wholesale cheese
and butter markets through CCC purchases at an-
nounced purchase prices. As a result, the butter
and cheese wholesale market equilibrium condi-
tions are different than those for the fluid milk and
frozen wholesale markets. The wholesale cheese
and butter markets have the following general
specification:
(2. 1) Qwdi= f(Pw’[Swdi),
(2.2) QWSi = fipwil ywi),
(2.3) Qw’i = Q“di -t- AIiWi + Q’i,
where: Qwdiand Qwsiare wholesale demand and
supply, respectively, for product i (z’ = cheese
or butter), Pwiis the wholesale price of product i,
Swdiis a vector of wholesale demand shifters for
product i, and S’”S’ is a vector of wholesale supply
shifters for product i. The vectors of demand and
supply shifters contain variables similar to those in
the fluid and frozen product equations. The vari-
able, AINVi, is change in commercial inventories
for product i, which is assumed to be exogenous in
the model. The variable, Qg’is CCC purchases of
product i.
As previously mentioned, the DPSP is incorpo-
rated by constraining the wholesale market cheese
and butter prices to be equal to their respective
CCC purchase prices, i.e.:
(3.1)
pw = pw,
(3.2) Pwb = Pgb,
where: Pgcand Pgbarethe CCC purchase prices for
cheese and butter, respectively. The assumption
that the support prices for cheese and butter are
always binding is plausible because government160 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
removals of cheese were positive in all but one
quarter, and government removals of butter were
pos9~ in all but five quarters from 1975 through
The farm milk market is defined by the milk
supply function:
(4) Q“’ = flE(F”)lSf”’)
where: @m’ is farm raw milk supply, ,?@m) is
the expected farm milk price, and #m’ is a vector
of milk supply shifters including the price of
slaughter cows, feed costs, and lagged milk sup-
ply. As in the model developed by LaFrance and
de Gorter, a perfect foresight specification is used
for the expected farm milk price.3
Under the federal milk marketing order pro-
gram, milk handlers pay Class I and II prices, and
farmers receive a weighted average of the class
prices—the blend price. With the weights equal to
the utilization of milk among products, the blend
price is:
(P” + d) * Qwf’+ PII * QWfZS
+ P“ * Qwcs -t P1l * Qwb’
@ll .
(5.1)
Q@’ + Qwfz~ + QWCS + QWb$
where P1 is the Class 11price, d is the fixed Class
I differential (the Class I price is equal to # + d),
QWfS is wholesale fluid milk supply, Q“”z’is whole-
sale frozen product supply, Qwcs is wholesale
cheese supply, and Q‘b’ is wholesale butter sup-
ply.
The model is closed by the equilibrium condi-
tion:
(5.2) @m’ = Qwfs + Qwfzs + Qwcs + Qwbs
-1- FUSE + OTHER,
2 A theoretically more appealing approach would be to recognizethat
there are actually four market regimes possible (1) PWC > pgcandPwb
> Pk’b,(2) /V”C > Pgc~d p$-b= @, (3) PW = p& and Pwb> ps’b,
or (4) Pwc = pg. andpwb = p@. I.Jnder this approach, one should use
a simultaneous switching regression procedure to estimate the model in
order to correct for selectivity bias due to the switching betweenregimes
(Liu et al.). However, applying this procedure to tbe present model
would be rather complicated since cheese and butter are considered
separate]y in the model, and the potential benefits of doing so were
judged to be minimal since market prices for cheese and butter were not
higher than their purchase prices for the majority of quarters over this
period (1975-90),
3 Severafempirical specifications for price expectations were consid-
ered. However, over the period 1980-90, the milk price in the next
quarter was fairly predictable because of the very high correlation be-
tween the observable support price and the farm milk price, and the
stable seasonal pattern in the milk price. Hence, a perfect foresight
assumption in a quarterly model seems plausible. Also, the perfect fore-
sight assumption is appropriate for the supply control, target price-
deticiencypayment, andgradualderegulationscenariosbecausethe milk
price, underthese scenarios, is always close to the governmentmandated
price and easily predicted. However, it should be noted that tbe price
expectations process would change under the immdlate deregulating
scenario, and this sbotdd be kept in mind when examining tbe results of
this scenario,
where: FUSE is on-farm use of milk and OTHER is
milk used in dairy products other than fluid milk,
frozen products, butter, or cheese. Both of these
variables represent a small share of total milk pro-
duction and are treated as exogenous. The model
contains 13 endogenous variables, and 13 equations
and identities (see Table 2 for variable definitions).
Estimated Model
The wholesale and farm equations were estimated
using two stage least squares with quarterly data
from 1975 through 1990. To deal with simultane-
ity y bias between price and quantity, instrumental
variables were constructed for all prices (wholesale
fluid milk and frozen product prices, Class II
price, and farm milk price) by regressing them on
all exogenous variables in the wholesale and farm
markets. All equations in the model are of double-
log functional form. Estimation results for the
structural equations are presented in Table 1. All
variables and data sources are defined in Table 2.
In the wholesale per capita fluid milk demand
equation, the CPI for nonalcoholic beverages was
used as a proxy for the price of fluid milk substi-
tutes. Generic fluid milk advertising was included
to capture the impacts of generic advertising on
fluid milk demand (Ward and Dixon). Similar to
Liu et al. and Kaiser et al., a four quarter, second-
order polynomial distributed lag, with both end
point restrictions imposed, was specified for ge-
neric fluid milk advertising. The variables SIN,
and COS,, which represent the first wave of the
sine and cosine, respectively (Doran and Quilkey),
were included to capture seasonality in fluid milk
demand.
In the wholesale per capita frozen product de-
mand equation, unlike the demand functions for
the three other dairy products, the price of frozen
product substitutes produced inferior statistical re-
sults and therefore was omitted. The specification
of the price to income ratio is consistent with the
zero degree homogeneity assumption for price and
income (Phlips). Since generic advertising on fro-
zen products from 1975 through 1990 was incon-
sequential, this variable was not included in the
frozen product demand equation.
In the wholesale per capita cheese demand equa-
tion, the CPI for meat was included as a proxy for
the price of cheese substitutes. Deflated per capita
income appears to have virtually no effect on
cheese demand, as evidenced by its insignificant
coefficient. Generic cheese advertising was in-
cluded to capture the impacts of generic advertis-
ing on cheese demand (Blaylock and Blisard) and
was modeled analogously to the fluid advertisingKaiser Alternative Dairy Policies 161
Table 1. Results for the Econometric Dairy Modell
Wholesale Fluid Milk Demand:
in (Qwfd/POP)= – 2.378 – .041 in (Pwf/Pkv) + .252 In (INCOME/CPI) + .005 In DGFAD
(- 19.9) (-2.4) (6.6) (8.1)
+ .008 in DGFAD_, + .009 in DGFAD.2 + .008 in DGFAD-3 + .005 in DGFAD-4 - .067 in T
(8.1) (8.1) (8.1) (8.1) (-13.5)
+ .021 SIN] + .031 COS1 + pwfd
(10.7) (16.1) R2 = .94; DW = 1.5
Wholesa!e Frozen Product Demand:
hr (Qwfzd/POP)= – 4.746 – .159 in (Pwfz/INCOME)– .027 In T - .148 SINI – .157 COS,
(-55.5) (-4.9) (-3.8) (-31.1) (-33.1)
– .022 COS2+ p“f’d
(-6.7) R2 = .97; DW = 1.6
Wholesale Cheese Demand:
in (Qwcd/POP)= -5.059 – .353 In (Pgc/Pmea)- .015 in (INCOME/CPI) + .046 COS2
(-3.3) (-2.4) (-.04) (4.6)
+ .003 hr GCAD + .005 In GCAD_, + .006 hr GCAD.2 + .005 In GCAD–3 + .003 in GCAD-4
(1.6) (1.6) (1,6) (1.6) R2 = .58; DW = 1.6
Wholesale Butter Demand:
In (Qwbd/POP)= – 2.610 – .267 in (Pgb/Pfa’)+ 1.027 In (INCOME/CPI) + .002 In DGBAD
(-1.8) (-2.3) (1.5) (0.9)
– .00011 T2 + .109 COSL + .027 COS2 + IAWM
(-2.2) (5.5) (1.9) R* = .38; DW = 1.9
Wholesale Fluid Milk Supply:
in Qwfs= .322 + .142 In (Pwf/(~r + d)) – .016 In (Pfe/(PIf+ d)) + .641 In (Qwf’)-,
(3.4) (6.4) (–2.7) (6.8)
+ .135 In (QwfS)_4+ .041 COS1 + .004 COS2 + (1/(1 + .274 L)) pwf’
(1.4) (8.3) (2.1) (1.8) R’ = ,96; Dh = – .4
Wholesale Frozen Produci Supply:
in Qwfz’= .494 + .071 In (Pwfz/PfI)+ .255 in (Qwfzs) -4 + .058 In T – .110 SIN,
(5.8) (1.0) (1.9) (6.2) (-5.3)
–.118 COS1 – .016 COS2 + .377 I.L_lwfzs
(-5.8) (-3.6) (3.0) R’ = .98; Dh = 1.4
Wholesale Cheese Supply:
In Qwcs= 2.349 + .268 In (Pgc/P1l)– .306 in (MWAGE/~]) + .010 T
(13.3) (3.1) (3.9) (15.3)
- .038 DTG – .054 COS, + .020 COS2 + .782 I.Lw”’
(-2.0) (-7.5) (3.9) (9.1) R2 = .94; DW = 1.3
Wholesale Butter Supply:
In Qwb’ = 1.457 + .274 hr (Pgb/P’l)+ .446 in (QWb’)-, + .004 T – .057 MDP
(4.2) (2.7) (3.8) (4.1) (-1.7)
- .077 DTG + .214 SIN1 + .028 COS1 + pwbs
(-2.3) (14.7) (1.1) R2 = .87; Dh = 1.8
1.3
Farm Milk Supply:
in Qfm’ = 2.584 + .076 In (Pfm/Pf’ed)+ .087 hr (POw/Ppf’)+ .052 in Qfms _~
(5.6) (1.7) (-2.8) (0.7)
+ .211 in QfmS+ .003 T – .026 MDP - .033 DTP - .046 COS1 + .405 I.Lfms
(1.7) (5.4) (-2.7) (–3.0) (-5.6) (2.7)
R2 = .94; Dh = 1.3
‘Values in parentheses are t-ratios, R2 is the adjusted coefficient of variation, DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, and Dh is the
Durbln-h statistic.
expenditures using a four quarter, second-order
polynomial distributed lag with both end point re-
strictions imposed.
In the wholesale per capita butter demand equa-
tion, the CPI for fats and oils was included as a
proxy for the price of butter substitutes. Current
generic butter advertising yielded better statistical
results than the second-degree polynomial distrib-
uted lag specification, and was therefore used in
the butter demand equation. It appears that con-
sumers respond immediately to generic butter ad-
vertising and the impact of such advertising is
short-lived, The adjusted R* for this equation was
the lowest of all equations.4
4 This is partially due to the existence of four outliers: quarter 2 of
1977, quarter 2 of 1980, and quarters 1 and 2 of 1989, When intercept
dummyvariables were used to accountforthese outliera, the adjusted R2
increases to ,61. However, since there is no theoreticaljustification for
inclusion of these dummy variables, they wefe omitted.162 October 1994 Agrictdtura!-and Resource Economics Review
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Data Sources for the Econometric Model
Endogenous Variables (in alphabetical order):
Pfm = farm milk price measured in $/cwt., from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
P[’ = Class H price for raw milk measured in $/cwt., from Federal Milk Order Market Statistics,
Pwf = wholesale fluid milk price index (1982 = 100), from Producer Price Index (and Wholesale Price Index),
Pwfz = wholesale price index for frozen daily products (1982 = 100), from Producer Price Index (and Wholesale Price
Index),
Q‘m’= raw mitk supply measured in bil. lbs., from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
Q’b = government purchases of butter in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent (in identity, not behavioral equations), from
Dairy Situation and Outfook,
Qgc = government purchases of cheese in bil. Ibs. of milkfat equivalent (in identity, not behavioral equations), from
Dairy Situation and Outlook,
Q‘bd = wholesale butter demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, computed as butter supply minus
government purchases of butter minus change in commercial butter inventories (from Cold Storage),
Q‘b’ = wholesale butter supply measured in bil. Ibs. of milkfat equivalent (Qwbs= Qwbd),from Dairy Products Annual
Summary,
Qwed= wholesale cheese demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, computed as cheese supply minus
government purchases of cheese minus change in commercial cheese inventories (from Cold Storage),
Qw., = wholesale cheese supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, (QWCS = Qwcd),from Dairy Products
Annual Summary,
Qwf = wholesale fluid milk quantity measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent (note that wholesale fluid demand is
equal to supply, i.e., Qwfs= Qwfd),from Cox,
Q‘f’ = wholesafe frozen dairy product quantity measured in bil. Ibs. of milkfat equivalent (note that wholesale frozen
demand is equal to supply, i.e., Qwfzs= Qwfzd),from Dairy Products Annual Summary,




























harmonic seasonal v~able representing the first wave of the cosine function,
harmonic seasonal variable representing the second wave of the cosine function,
Consumer price index for rdl items (1982-84 = 100),
Class I fixed price differential for raw milk measured in $/cwt., computed as Class I price minus Class II price,
generic butter advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured in thousand $, from
Blaylock,
generic cheese advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured in thousand $, from
Blaylock,
generic fluid milk advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured in thousand $, from
Blaylock,
Durbin-h statistic,
intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 for 1986.2 through 1987.3; equal to O
otherwise,
Durbin-Watson statistic,
disposable personal income per capita, measured in thousand $, from Employment and Earnings,
lag operator,
intercept dummy variable for tbe Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 1984.1 through 1985.2; equal to O
otherwise,
average hourly wage in manufactured sector $/hour, from Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics,
Consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages (1982–84 = 100), from Consumer Price Index,
U.S. average slaughter cow price measured in $/cwt., from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
Consumer retail price index for fats and oils (1982–84 = 100), from Consumer Price Index,
Producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index (and Wholesale Price
Index),
U.S. average price per ton of 16% protein dairy feed, from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
U.S. index of prices received by fnrmerx from Agricultural Prices,
government purchase price for butter measured in cents/lb., from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
government purchase price for cheese measured in cents/lb., from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
Consumer retail price index for meat (1982-84 = 100), from Consumer Price Index,
U.S. population measured in millions, from Handbookof Basic Economic Statistics,
adjusted coefficient of determination,
harmonic seasonal variable representing the first wave of the sine function,
time trend variable for the retail and wholesale-level equations, equal to 1 for 1975. 1, ,
error term for equation i.
In the wholesale fluid milk supply equation, the for variable energy costs. The inclusion of lagged
Class I milk price represents the most important endogenous variables represents capacity con-
variable cost to fluid processors, The producer straints, while the cosine variable captures season-
price index for fuel and energy was used as a proxy ality in the fluid milk supply. A first-order autore-Kaiser
gressive error structure was specified to correct for
autocorrelation.
In the wholesale frozen product supply equa-
tion, the Class II price was included because it
represents the most important variable cost to fro-
zen product manufacturers. The lagged endoge-
nous variables were incorporated as capacity con-
straints on frozen product supply. The time trend
was a proxy for technological change in frozen
product manufacturing, and the sine and cosine
variables capture seasonality in supply. Based on
the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation
functions, a first-order moving average error struc-
ture was imposed.
In the wholesale cheese supply equation, the
Class II price was included since it is the most
important variable cost to cheese processors. The
average manufacturing wage rate was a proxy for
labor costs. The time trend was a proxy for tech-
nological change in cheese processing, and the in-
tercept dummy variable corresponding to the quar-
ters the 1986-87 DTP was in effect was included
to capture its impact on reducing the milk supply.
The cosine variable measures the seasonality in
cheese supply. A first-order moving average error
structure was specified to correct for autocorrelation.
In the wholesale butter supply equation, the
Class H price was included since it is the most
important variable cost to butter processors. Butter
supply lagged one quarter was a proxy for capacity
constraints in butter manufacturing. The time trend
was a proxy for technological change in butter pro-
cessing, and the intercept dummy variables for the
two supply control programs measure the effects
they had on reducing milk availability for butter.
The sine and cosine variables capture the season-
ality in butter supply.
For the farm milk market, the milk supply equa-
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tion includes the price of 16% protein feed because
it is one of the most important variable costs to
dairy farmers. The deflated price of slaughter cows
was a proxy for opportunity costs of milk produc-
tion. Lagged milk supply was included to reflect
biological capacity constraints for current milk
production, while the time trend measures techno-
logical progress in dairy farming. The two inter-
cept dummy variables capture the reduction in
milk supply that occurred during the MDP and
DTP, and the cosine variable measures seasonality
in milk production. A moving average error struc-
ture was imposed to correct for autocorrelation.
Model Validation
The model was dynamically simulated to assess its
ability to replicate historical values for the endog-
enous variables. The time period chosen for this
dynamic in-sample simulation was from the first
quarter of 1980 (i.e., 1980.1) through the fourth
quarter of 1990 (i.e., 1990.4). This period was
also the period used for the simulation and was
chosen because it corresponds to a time when there
was much discussion of implementing alternative
dairy policies.
To conduct the dynamic simulation, all exoge-
nous variables were set equal to their historic lev-
els for the simulation period. For the first quarter
in the simulation, all lagged dependent variables
were set equal to their actual levels for the previous
period and the system of equations was solved si-
multaneously using the Newton method. For all
subsequent quarters in the simulation, the pre-
dicted endogenous variables become the lagged
endogenous variables in the model. This process
was repeated until the last period of the simulation
was reached.
Table 3 shows the root-mean-square-percent
Table 3. Quarterly Averages for Actual and Simulated Endogenous Variables from the
Dynamic Simulation and Root-Mean-Square Percent Errors
Actual Simulated Root-Mean-Square
Endogenous Variable Unit Average Average Percent-Error
Fluid milk demand bil lbs 13.04 13.07 0.93
Frozen product demand bil lbs 3.20 3.21 2.54
Cheese demand bil lbs 8.93 8.84 8.81
Cheese supply bil lbs 9.72 9.56 5.05
Butter demand bil lbs 4.69 4.62 [1.60
Butter supply bil lbs 6.38 6.53 8.44
Wholesale fluid milk price 1982 = 100 104.28 99.93 11.17
Wholesale frozen price 1982 = 100 106.36 102.13 7.05
Class II price $Icwt 11.94 11.32 14.44
Farm milk supply bil lbs 34.95 34.96 2.01
Farm milk price $Icwt 13.10 12.26 13.39
CCC cheese bil lbs 0.82 0.75 68.39
CCC butter bil Ibs 1,69 1.90 44.41164 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
simulation error (RMSPE), as well as the actual
and simulated average values for all of the endog-
enous variables in the model. Generally, the RM-
SPESfor the supply and demand quantities are rea-
sonable, given the rigor of a dynamic simulation
test. All wholesale and farm supply and demand
quantities have RMSPES under 11.6%. With re-
spect to prices, the RMSPES are somewhat higher,
ranging from a low of 7.170 for the wholesale fro-
zen product price to a high of 14.4% for the Class
II price. Finally, the RMSPES for CCC cheese and
butter purchases are 68.4910and 44.4%, respec-
tively. While these may appear high, due to the
small magnitude of these variables, a small devi-
ation from the actual value leads to a large RM-
SPE. Based on overall performance, the simula-
tion model was deemed reasonable for the purpose
of comparing policy scenarios.
Government Dairy Policy Scenarios
The six policy scenarios considered were: (1) cur-
rent program (baseline), (2) immediate deregula-
tion by immediate elimination of the DPSP, (3)
gradual deregulation by lowering the government
purchase prices for cheese and butter by 10% per
year over the simulation period, (4) target price-
deficiency payment program without supply con-
trol, (5) target price-deficiency payment program
with supply control, and (6) mandatory supply
control program. For each scenario, it was as-
sumed that the policy was in effect for the period
1980.1 through 1990.4.
In the baseline policy scenario, the government
purchase prices for cheese and butter were set
equal to their actual levels for this period. Also,
the dummy variables for the two voluntary supply
control programs (MDP and DTP) were included
in the equations to reflect the impact of these pro-
grams on milk and dairy product supplies, For the
other policy scenarios, the dummy variables for
the MDP and DTP were set equal to zero for all
quarters. The baseline represents the historical
simulation of actual policy (the same as the in-
sample simulation conducted to validate the
model) to which the alternative policy simulations
are compared,
The immediate deregulation scenario assumed
that the DPSP was removed at the beginning of
1980. In this case, the model was modified by
setting the purchase prices for cheese and butter to
zero and forcing the competitive market to clear
and determine equilibrium prices for all products
including cheese and butter.
Because it is unlikely that the government would
eliminate the DPSP immediately, a gradual phase
out scenario was included. Under this scenario, the
CCC continued cheese and butter purchases, but
the purchase price for each product was reduced by
10% each year after 1980. Gradual deregulation is
not as disruptive to the wholesale and farm mar-
kets, and would likely be more politically accept-
able than immediate elimination of the price sup-
port program. As in the immediate deregulation
scenario, the model was solved allowing the com-
petive market to determine equilibrium prices for
all products. However, if the resulting wholesale
market price for cheese (or butter) was lower than
its purchase price, then the wholesale price was set
equal to the purchase price and thes ystem of equa-
tions was solved again. This insured that the
wholesale prices for cheese and butter were always
at least as high as their purchase prices.
The target price-deficiency payment program
scenario assumed that the DPSP was replaced by a
$13.00 per hundredweight target price for farm
milk. The model was modified by adding the fol-
lowing requirement: if the simulated farm milk
price for any quarter was below $13.00 per hun-
dredweight, than a deficiency payment was added
to the milk price and the model was solved again
for that quarter treating the $13.00 farm milk price
as exogenous. If the farm milk price for any quar-
ter was at or above $13.00 per hundredweight, no
deficiency payment was made.
A target price-deficiency payment program
could incur large government costs. Thus, a sec-
ond scenario was added in which for any quarter
that total deficiency payments exceeded $310 mil-
lion (simulated quarterly average government costs
for the baseline-actual policy scenario), a supply
control program was triggered and required farm-
ers to reduce milk marketing to a point where
government costs no longer exceeded $310 mil-
lion.5 This policy reduced government costs by:
(1) reducing the quantity of milk deficiency pay-
ments were paid on, and (2) reducing the quantity
supplied, thus raising the market price and lower-
ing the deficiency payment rate.
In the supply control scenario, it was assumed
that the DPSP was eliminated and a $13.00 per
hundredweight price was achieved by restricting
the milk supply. It was assumed that the govern-
ment’s ability to control supply is perfect, which is
5This feature was incorporatedinto the model by reducing farm milk
supply in increments of 10 million pounds and re-solving the model.
This process was repeated until the government cost restriction was
satisfied. By using such a small increment to reduce supply in each
iteration(10millionpounds out of a nationalsupply averaging35 bOlion
puundsperquarter), greater accuracycould be achievedin convergingto
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Figure 1. Impact of alternative dairy policies on milk production for selected years, 1980-90,
quarterly average quantities and prices from the a reasonable assumption since the government
could set a zero price for over-quota milk market-
ing. Under this type of program, the government
would estimate commercial demand as well as the
level of milk supply needed to generate an equi-
librium price of $13.00. Once the proper level of
national supply is determined, then production or
marketing quotas are allocated to farmers. Farm-
ers’ quotas would likely be based on historical pro-
duction over some designated time period. It was
assumed that farmers receive $13.00 per hundred-
weight for all milk sold within quota, and zero for
milk sold over-quota. 6This alternative is similar to
the target price-deficiency payment program with
supply control, but with no deficiency payments
consumer prices are higher and supply is slightly
lower.
Results
Equilibrium quantities and prices for each scenario
were simulated over the time period 1980.1
through 1990.4. The results of the six policy sce-
narios are presented in Table 4, which reports the
baseline results and the percentage change in the
6 If the simulated farm milkpricefor anyquarter was less than $13.00
per hundredweight, then 10million poundsof milk were subtractedfrom
the milk supply and the model was re-solved given the new milk supply
level. Thisiterativeprocedure ofreducing the milk supply in 10million
pound increments was continued until the farm milk price reached
$13.00 or more. Again, hy using such a small increment to reduce
supply in each iteration, greater accuracy could be achieved in converg-
ing to an equilibrium price close to $13.00 per hundredweight.
baseline scenario. Market variables are shown
graphically for 1980, 1985, and 1990 in Figures
1-5.
In the farm market, the milk supply consistently
increased from 1980 to 1990 under all six scenar-
ios due to increases in cow productivity, as shown
in Figure 1. The milk supply was the lowest under
the supply control alternative. To receive the ben-
efit of a $13.00 per hundredweight minimum
price, farmers would have to reduce milk market-
ing by about 3.270. The milk supply was the high-
est under the target price-deficiency payment with-
out supply control alternative (hereafter referred as
the first target price-deficiency payment alterna-
tive) because the effective farm milk price (market
price plus deficiency payment) was higher than for
the other policies that do not restrict supply. On the
other hand, the milk supply was lower, on aver-
age, than the baseline under the target price-
deficiency payment program with supply control
(hereafter called the second target price-deficiency
payment alternative). To contain government ex-
penditures under this program, farm milk supply
had to be lower than the baseline. The milk supply
under the two deregulation scenarios was quite
comparable. As shown in Figure 1, the milk sup-
ply was almost the same for both deregulation sce-
narios after 1985.
The farm milk price was highest under the sup-
ply control policy, The milk price was very stable
in this scenario, averaging $13.06 per hundred-
weight (Figure 2). The farm milk price was similar
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Figure 2. Impact of alternative dairy policies on farm milk prices for selected years, 1980-90.
grams. The farm price was the lowest in the im-
mediate deregulation scenario. The farm price was
also lower under the gradual deregulation scenario.
After 1983, the farm milk price was quite similar
between the two deregulation scenarios. Interest-
ingly, there was more price instability under grad-
ual deregulation than there was under immediate
deregulation; the gradual deregulation policy had a
coefficient of variation for the farm price of
19,070. Most of this volatility occurred at the be-
ginning of the simulation when the market was
adjusting to the new policy. The supply control











price variability with a coefficient of variation of
0.3%. The baseline, immediate deregulation, and
first and second target price-deficiency payment
policies had coefficient of variations for the farm
price of 12,190, 17.5%, 0.4910,and 0.8%, respec-
tively.
Regarding farm welfare, there was a positive
trend in producer surplus over time under the two
target price-deficiency payment programs and sup-
ply control alternatives (Figure 3). Farmers were
best off under the first target price-deficiency pay-
ment policy. Farmers were also better off under the
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Figure 3. Impact of alternative dairy policies on producer surplus for selected years, 1980-90.Kaiser
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Figure 4. Impact of alternative dairy policies on direct costs of dairy price support program for
seficted years,- 1980-90.
and the supply control program. Farmers were bet-
ter off with the first target price-deficiency pay-
ment program relative to the supply control alter-
natives. Prices received were comparable for the
programs, but supply was not restricted under the
first target price-deficiency payment program. In
the two deregulation scenarios, there was a nega-
tive trend in producer surplus over time (Figure 3).
Dairy farmers were worse off, as a group, under
both deregulation scenarios. These results suggest
that producers, as a group, would favor supply
control and both target price-deficiency payment
programs over the current price support program,
but would definitely not favor deregulation over
the current policy.
Government costs under the baseline and the
gradual deregulation scenarios were calculated as
the product of the purchase price for cheese (con-
verted to a dollars per hundredweight of raw milk
basis) times total CCC purchases of cheese and
butter on a milkfat equivalent basis.7 Government
cost for the two deficiency payment programs was
computed as the product of the deficiency payment
(dollars per hundredweight) times the farm milk
supply. There were no government costs for the
7 The purchase price for butter is not used here because butter is
jointly prcduced with nonfat dry milk, and one needs nonfat dry milk
purchases to convertthese twoproducts to a milk equivalentbasis. Since
nonfat dry milk is not included in the model, one cannot compute the
milkequivalent purchaseprice forbutter and nonfatdry milk. The use of
the cheese purchase price only to measure monetarycosts to the CCC is
reasonable since afl purchase prices are quite close when convertedto a
milk equivalent measure.
immediate deregulation or the supply control sce-
narios.
The simulations indicated that the first target
price-deficiency payment program was the most
expensive for the government (Table 4 and Figure
4). Government costs for this program averaged
$1.3 billion per quarter, which is 316% higher than
the $310 million per quarter that the baseline pol-
icy costs. This policy, therefore, would obviously
be at a disadvantage from a political standpoint,
given current federal budget deficit pressures.
However, when supply control was added to the
second target price-deficiency payment program,
government costs were actually lower by almost
20%, on average, than the baseline. Hence, with
standby supply control, target price-deficiency
payment programs can be designed to not incur
excessive government costs. Gradual deregulation
would also save the tax payers money relative to
the baseline. Purchases of cheese and butter by the
CCC under the gradual deregulation scenario were
81.3% and 60.690 lower, respectively, than they
were under the baseline. Government costs in this
case were 71.O%lower, on average, and declined
over time. If the government had started to de-
crease purchase prices in 1981, government pur-
chases and costs of the DPSP would not have in-
creased as they did, but would have actually de-
creased. The best policies in terms of reducing
government costs were the immediate deregulation
and supply control policies, which had no associ-
ated government costs. Given current Federal def-
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Figure 5. Im~act of alternative dairv policies on commercial disappearance of dairy products for . .
se~cted years; 198(L90.
Regarding the wholesale market, commercial
demand for all alternatives was higher than the
baseline policy. Commercial demand for all prod-
ucts was highest under the first target price-
deficiency payment program. This was due to the
average wholesale prices for all four products be-
ing substantially lower for this alternative than for
the other alternatives (see Table 4). Commercial
wholesale demand was higher under the two de-
regulation scenarios compared to the baseline.
This was due to the wholesale prices for all prod-
ucts being lower under deregulation relative to the
baseline. Commercial demand was higher in the
second target price-deficiency payment scenario
than the baseline, which was again due to lower
wholesale prices (except for frozen products).
While fluid milk and frozen product demand was
lower in the supply control scenario than in the
baseline, cheese and butter demand was actually
higher. This seemingly counter-intuitive result is
explained by lower wholesale cheese and butter
prices (9% and 24.2% lower than the baseline)
with no support program. The net effect was com-
mercial disappearance being 2.4?40higher, on av-
erage, under the supply control program than the
baseline. It should also be noted that while cheese
and butter commercial use increased under supply
control relative to the baseline, cheese and butter
supplies actually decreased by 1.7% and 14.2%,
respectively. These supply responses were due to
the loss in sales to the government since the price
support program was terminated under this scenario.
Extrapolating the wholesale results to the retail
level, it appears that consumers would favor the
first target price-deficiency payment program over
all other policies because it resulted in the lowest
prices. Wholesale prices for all products were sub-
stantially lower for this alternative than all other
policies. In this case, the wholesale fluid milk
price was 45.0% lower, the wholesale frozen
product price was 32.4% lower, the wholesale
cheese price was 2.2% lower, and the wholesale
butter price was 60.4% lower than the baseline on
average. However, the tremendous magnitude of
price advantage of this program for consumers
would likely be offset by the corresponding tax
burden required to pay for the program. Since con-
sumers are also tax payers, they would obviously
find this an unattractive aspect of the first target
price-deficiency payment program. Consumers
were better off under the immediate and gradual
deregulation scenarios. Regarding immediate de-
regulation, wholesale fluid milk, frozen product,
cheese, and butter prices averaged 18.270, 10 ,7Y0,
6,9%, and 39.4% lower than in the baseline. All
wholesale prices for gradual deregulation were
also lower than the baseline, but slightly higher
than the immediate deregulation case (see Table
4). With the exception of the wholesale frozen
price, which was 0.2% higher, all other wholesale
prices were slightly lower under the second target
price-deficiency payment program than the base-
line. While wholesale fluid milk and frozen prod-
uct prices were slightly higher than the baseline,
on average, under supply control, wholesale butter
and cheese prices were 8.3$%0 and 20.7T0lower.Kaiser Alternative Dairy Policies 169
Table 4. Selected Market Variables Under the Five Daily Policy Alternatives as a Percent of
the Baseline Values
Target Price-Def Target Price-Def
Baseline Immediate Gradual Payment Witbout Payment with supply
(quarterly Deregulation Deregulation Supply Control Supply Control Control
Market Variable Unit average) (% change) (% change) (% change) (% change) (% change)
Fluid milk
demand bil lbs 13.07 0.82 0.65 2.57 0.01 –0.20
Frozen product
demand bil lbs 3.21 1.85 1.46 6.93 0.19
Cheese demand
–0.46
bil lbs 8.84 2.58 2.05 0.77 2.86 3.47
Cheese supply bil lbs 9.56 –2.53 – 1.93 – 4.20 – 1.64 -1.71
Butter demand bil lbs 4.62 18,89 14.42 40.28 9.84
Butter supply
9.94
bil Ibs 6.53 –7.87 –5.09 7.27 –11.17 – 14,20
Wholesale fluid
milk price 1982 = 100 99.93 – 18.22 – 14.67 –45,03 –0.01 4.92
Wholesale frozen
price 1982 = 100 102.13 – 10.68 -8.63 -32,40 0,17 2.96
Wholesale cheese
price cents/lb 1.28 – 6.92 –5.58 – 2.22 –7.37 –9.07
Wholesale butter
price cents/lb 1.37 –39.39 –31,60 –60.36 –25.24 –24.19
C1assII price $/cwt 11.32 –25.66 – 20.42 – 60.48 –0.82 6,83
Farm milk supply bil lbs 34.96 – 1.68 –1.10 1.81 –2.51 –3.24
Farm milk price $Icwt 12,26 –23.48 –18.71 6.12 6.26
CCC cheese’
6.57
bil lbs 0.75 NA -81.29
CCC butter]
NA NA NA
bil lbs 1,90 NA –60.58 NA NA NA
Producer surplus bil $ 4.17 –25.02 – 20.03 8.51 4.63 4.23
Government cost2 bil $ 0.31 NA – 70.97 316.13 – 19.35 NA
Deficiency
payment3 $Icwt NA NA NA 3.66 0.75 NA
‘In the immediate deregulation, target price-deficiency payment, and supply control scenarios, there are no CCC purchases.
2Govemmentcosts for the baseline and gradualderegulationscenariosarecalculated as the productof the purchaseprice for cheese
on a milkfat equivalent basis, times total CCC purchases of cheese and butter on a milkfat equivalent basis. Government costs of
the target price-deficiency payment scenariosare calculated as the productof the deficiency paymenttimes milk supply. There are
no government costs for the immediate deregulation and supply control scenarios.
3The number for the target price-deficiency payment scenarios is the actual average payment on a $/cwt. basis rather than a
percentage change basis.
The results indicate that there is a trade-off
among some of the policies in terms of consumer
welfare and government costs. For instance, as
was mentioned above, the deficiency payment pro-
gram without supply control resulted in the lowest
wholesale prices, but also had the highest gover-
nmentcosts. This trade-off was also observed for
the supply control program, which resulted in the
lowest direct costs to the government, but also had
the highest fluid and frozen product prices.
Summary
The purchase of this paper was to examine the
potential market impacts of alternative dairy policy
alternatives. The policies analyzed were: (1) a
baseline price support program (present policy),
(2) immediate deregulation where the price support
program is eliminated, (3) gradual deregulation
where the support prices for dairy products are
decreased by 10% per year, (4) a target price-
deficiency payment program without supply con-
trol, (5) a target price-deficiency payment program
with supply control, and (6) a mandatory supply
control program. A model of the national dairy
industry was used to simulate quarterly equilib-
rium price and quantity values at the farm and
wholesale levels for each policy over the period
1980-90.
The results indicated that there are gainers and
losers for each policy option, Consumers were bet-
ter off under both immediate and gradual deregu-
lation because prices were lower, enabling them to
consume more dairy products. Consumers were
also better off under the two target price-deficiency
payment programs due to lower prices. Consumers
of fluid milk and frozen products were worse off
under supply control since wholesale prices were
at their highest under this alternative. However,
wholesale cheese and butter prices were actually
lower with supply control than under the baseline170 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
due to the elimination of the DPSP. Consequently,
consumers of cheese and butter were better off
under supply control than under current policy.
Farmers, as a group, were better off under the two
target price-deficiency payment programs and the
supply control program, where milk prices and
producer surplus were highest. Farmers suffered
the most in the immediate deregulation scenario
where both the farm price and producer surplus
were at their lowest. Tax payers were best off un-
der immediate deregulation, supply control, and
the target price-deficiency payment program with
supply control. They were worse off under the tar-
get price-deficiency payment program without
supply control. Tax payers were also better off
under gradual deregulation. These results suggest
that the relative political weight of consumers,
farmers, and tax payers in the minds of policy
makers will be important in shaping future dairy
policy legislation<
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